Although not the reply, I’d wish to put some gentle on whether or not nodes ought to or shouldn’t be rewarded for validation:
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utilizing a light-weight node pockets places the pockets itself at (restricted) threat slightly than the entire community. For instance even when all full nodes are malicious, customers can resort to working their very own full-nodes (there are much less possible fork eventualities although). Customers are accountable for safety of their gentle wallets in the identical method they accountable for safety of their personal keys.
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The community can survive and preserve being decentralized (and include legitimate information) so long as there is no such thing as a monopoly on mining and no less than one full copy of block-chain(s) exists (miners or no less than mining swimming pools normally have full copy).
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SPV (easy fee verification) is powerful to assaults aimed toward stealing funds instantly from pockets if you happen to comply with n-confirmation rule. Gentle wallets are much less sturdy to eclipse assaults, 1-confirmation assaults (full node can disguise new transactions and longest chains from customers) and possibly some extra unique varieties.
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there are non-monetary incentives: https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Clearing_Up_Misconceptions_About_Full_Nodes#Delusion:_There_is_no_incentive_to_run_nodes_so_the_network_relies_on_altruism
P. S. with that stated whereas I’m not a giant fan of PoS – utilizing simplified overlay model of PoS (operator/stakeholder locks funds conditioned by itself “good conduct”) mixed with direct rewards as a secondary safety measure to extend availability, forestall sybil-attacks and de-incentivize full nodes from dishonest might work and stimulate working extra full nodes.
Though because it talked about in different solutions – proving that the node is full is tough to inconceivable, so it might solely assure that one node doesn’t faux to be a bunch of nodes and it might additionally give mechanisms for penalizing malicious nodes (forestall them from censorship for instance). The node could be rewarded solely for broadcasting transactions (and penalized for not doing so), they’d not be rewarded for different light-node to full-node interactions (like requesting a historical past and so on).
Such hypothetical mechanism wouldn’t require modifications to bitcoin consensus or current protocols, it might solely require change of sunshine pockets’s signing logic (the customers pockets would add extra “full node reward output” in transaction) and possibly some overlay protocols to penalize censorship and unavailability (it must be overlay as a result of bitcoin Script is just not virtually highly effective sufficient to test proofs inside contracts).
Nevertheless, once more because it was talked about, retailers and pockets suppliers will not be monopolized and naturally considerable (because of competitors) so introducing extra full-node charges for this sort of safety could also be a bit of bit an excessive amount of, however who is aware of :).
Observe: In concept, PoS as secondary verifier would additionally enhance security of 1-confirmation transactions as was argued in earliest (earlier than Eth and others have been even conceived) btc-related discussions involving @QuantumMechanic, however in observe stakeholder’s “approval” is incompatible with PoW (stakeholder/SPO has no method of realizing if miners would proceed constructing on prime of block stakeholder/SPO selected). So it might solely be relevant to forestall Sybil assaults, penalize censorship and enhance availability.
